SENATE COMMITTEE on ELECTIONS,
REAPPORTIONMENT & CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS
Voting
System Update:
How
Will
State Capitol,
Senator Debra Bowen, Chair
SENATOR DEBRA BOWEN, CHAIR:
_____________ informational
hearing on our voting systems in
All right,
let’s try that again. Since much of this
hearing is going to be focused on technology, it’s only appropriate that we
started with a glitch that prevented anybody outside this hearing room from
hearing anything I had to say. So, we’ll
start over.
Good morning,
I’m Senator Debra Bowen. We will shortly
be convening an informational hearing that will provide us with an update of
where we are with regard to being ready to vote in 2006. Members of the Senate Elections Committee who
wish to be here for the testimony or to ask questions, are invited to come to
Room 447. We have had a room
change. There is a fair amount of room
shuffling going on this morning in the Capitol, but we are in Room 447, and we
will convene in about one minute.
Good
morning. Today’s hearing is designed to
give us a snapshot of where California is in terms of having voting systems
that comply with the Help America Vote Act ,and the state law, that requires
every machine to produce an accessible voter verified paper audit trail—and you
will hear a lot of initials for that, but most commonly recently referred to as
an AVVPAT—where we expect to be by the time the June primary rolls around, and
how it is that we’re going to get there.
By my count in
I invited
Secretary of State Bruce McPherson, to join us today to give us an update and
answer some questions. Unfortunately, he
was unable to make it personally, but he has sent Under Secretary Bill Wood and
several members of his staff to sit in his place. Thank you for being with us this morning.
I have also
asked elections officials from seven different counties to join us, to talk
about their plans for the 2006 elections.
I imagine that there will be a fair number of questions.
I think it’s a
testament to the strength of our democracy that so many people come to evaluate
this, to listen to where we are, and to determine for themselves whether or not
There will be
a public comment period at the end of the hearing. Anyone who would like to take part should
sign in with the Senate sergeants some time during the course of the
hearings. Please list your name and
organization if you are representing one.
This is not a requirement of testimony, it’s just to help me run a more
orderly hearing.
Let me ask
Bill Wood, who is here on behalf of Secretary McPherson today, if he’ll come up
and kick things off for us—talk to us a little about where California is. And I understand that you have some other
staffers from the Secretary of State’s office, so perhaps you could start by
telling us who is here and what their particular area of responsibility and/or
expertise is.
BILL WOOD:
Good morning, Senator. I am
Bill Wood. I am under secretary of state. To my left is, Chris Reynolds, who is HAVA coordinator
for the state of
I have a very
brief comment and then certainly will be available for any questions you may
have, Senator.
The 2006
presidential elections set off a flurry of activity. One of the outcomes at the federal level was
the enactment of HAVA, the Help America Vote Act of 2002. This law put in place new requirements for
all states. It outlines specific changes
in the election process and mechanics of how we conduct elections
nationwide. Among those provisions
are: New voting system standards, and
for the first time, money has been allocated to the states for a purchase of voting
systems that comply with those standards.
Despite the fact that the federal
government has been late with issuing the funding and promulgating the specific
guidelines under this new law, Secretary McPherson has moved quickly and
methodically to navigate through evolving circumstances to put California on
the path toward compliance, the right way.
California has
reached a model agreement to establish a statewide voter registration database,
implemented new ID requirements, set up a system to notify provisional voters
on the status of their voter ballot, established a complaint procedure for
voter grievances, created a one-stop shop for military and overseas voters,
provided resources to counties to conduct additional poll worker training
programs, and to assist with established voter education programs, and work
with counties to replace punch card voting machines.
HAVA’s
remaining provision requires the placement of one accessible voting machine in
each polling place by the first federal election of this year. And as you know, this provision goes into
effect at the same time the law requiring a voter verified paper audit trail,
or as you indicated, one of the many initials that it may be known by, for
electronic voting systems is implemented is a state requirement. Those two elements of combined to create a
perfect storm.
All the major vendors already have
certified voting systems that comply with HAVA accessibility requirements, but
most are now caught up in the process of testing systems that meet both
accessibility and VVPAT requirements together.
Because California Elections Code Section 19250 prohibits certification
of direct recording electronic systems without federal qualification, these DRE
systems must be produced by vendors and submitted to federal independent
testing authorities for federal qualification.
It is these DRE voting systems, with the addition of a VVPAT, which are
now undergoing federal testing and qualification. These are the same DRE systems that most
readily meet all voting system mandates articulated in HAVA.
The Office of
the Secretary of State, under the leadership of Bruce McPherson, has taken all
of the prudent measures to work towards compliance with these remaining areas. And I’d like to review very briefly some of
our ongoing efforts.
We have
established an new Office of Voting Systems Technology Assessment to streamline
the certification process, and we stand ready to review new systems quickly and
thoroughly upon receiving complete applications. We are also prepared to borrow resources from
other divisions within the Secretary of State’s office if it will help to
expedite the process. In this regard, it
is important to note that as you know, state law requires a 30-day notice for a
public hearing for each new system as part of the certification process. So while we are moving as quickly as
possible, much of the time needed for the process is out of our control.
Secretary
McPherson has worked with each voting system vendor, clearly setting forth his
stringent guidelines for any system certified for use in
In addition,
we have outlined ten certification requirements to ensure the systems certified
for use in
We hosted a Voting
Systems Testing Summit here in
Secretary
McPherson has appointed a Voting Accessibility Advisory Committee to help and
advise him on the important issue of improving accessibility of the electoral
process to disabled voters.
In an effort
to help the counties to comply with these new requirements, Secretary McPherson
has worked closely with the fifty-eight county registrars, meeting personally
with them and helping them develop solutions for the challenges we are all
currently facing. This work is
continuing, and he will continue to stand by the counties, both legally and
procedurally, through this challenging time.
The national
landscape for voting systems has been evolving, and during these changing
times, Secretary McPherson’s top priority is to ensure the security,
reliability, and integrity of every vote cast, while making sure the systems
are accessible for all of California’s eligible voters. Voters deserve the assurance that systems
certified for use in
And just for a
moment, if I can, I think you all have binders in front of you. I’m going to refer very quickly to some
displays that are on the easel here, and I’ll refer to them in your
binders. They’ll be at tab-2 for the
HAVA status report; there will be a tab-3 for the spreadsheet status of voting
systems, and then there will be a tab-5 for
SENATOR BOWEN: Let me just as a question. Are these documents available for people in
the audience?
MR. WOOD:
If we don’t have enough copies, we can certainly make sure that we
have additional copies later this morning, Senator. And they are on our website.
SENATOR BOWEN: All right.
Let me see if I can get some assistance from the sergeants with making
copies so that people can follow during the hearing. I have them, obviously.
The graphs
that we’re looking at on the board, I think highlight the problem that visually
impaired voters have, because I’m only moderately visually impaired…
MR. WOOD:
Too far?
SENATOR BOWEN: Yes, I can’t read it. Sorry.
So, but I have a copy. I don’t
need to read it. But I think the point
is, that there are people, they’re going to struggle with these materials even
if they have them. And one of the things
I want to do as we do hearings on this, is try to make materials available
during the time of the hearing. But
right now we’ll live with an explanation while we get copies made of these
materials.
MR. WOOD:
Thank you, Senator. Maybe
we’ll start actually back with the one that appears at your tab-2. This the HAVA status report. As I indicated in my remarks, this outlines
kind of graphically the major provisions of HAVA that the state of
SENATOR BOWEN: We up here at the podium have the
materials, so let’s turn them and at least the people in the very front rows
will be able to see, if they’re close enough.
MR. WOOD:
And again, that’s the HAVA compliance status at this point.
What appears
in your binders at tab-3 is the status of voting systems. Again, this is on the Secretary of State’s
website. This is last dated as of
January 13. We’re going to be updating
it as changes occur, and certainly no later than monthly. This indicates the five voting system vendors
who have either applied for, or indicated that they’re going to be coming
forward with applications to be certified for use in the state of
And I think what this graphically
demonstrates is where each of the vendors is in terms of completing federal
testing, whether they have submitted a complete application to the Secretary of
State, whether there has been state certification, and then some very quick
explanatory notes of where things are, or where they are not. For example, the one system….well, below,
Diebold is ES&S, Hart, and Sequoia, and then a new vendor named
Populex.
The Diebold system, for example,
listed the various voting system components that is under review. Whether federal testing is complete, that’s
listed as “no.” Whether an application
has been received by the Secretary of State, that’s listed as “yes.” There is a blank for state certification because
there has been no decision. And then the
note indicates it’s been referred back to the independent testing authority
(ITA) for accubasic code review. And
that process continues on for the other vendors. And I think that, as I say, graphically illustrates
where each vendor is in relationship to the certification process.
And then finally, that appears in
your binder at tab-5, this is a listing of the 10-steps to voting certification
in the state of
Before I conclude, I’d like to take
this opportunity on behalf of Secretary of State Bruce McPherson and myself, to
acknowledge the very dedicated county elections officials who are with us
today, as well as those who are not in the room.
Thank you, can that concludes my
statement.
SENATOR BOWEN: Thank you. I do have a few questions and I think in
order to proceed in the most orderly way I’ll work in this way. First, I will explore a little bit the state
deadlines and the state process. Then you had made a reference to delays that
were caused by the federal government’s snail’s pace on some matters, and I’d
like to get a better understanding of what, if anything, we’re still waiting
for there, and what has been delayed.
And then finally, we will go to a discussion on a vendor by vendor basis
of where things stand.
And before we do that however,
Senator Battin is here with us. Do you
have any opening comments, Senator Battin?
SENATOR JIM BATTIN: Thank you, Madam Chair. This certainly is an important issue. And I represent
And I know that the whole HAVA
investigation for the federal government is, from my understanding, and I’m
sure you can correct me if I’m wrong, is that I think the federal government
now is still looking into what happened then, but is satisfied that the HAVA
monies are being handled appropriately now.
And I think Secretary McPherson should be commended for really working
on that.
It is a, you know, I have been
frustrated for the last year or so simply because I’m one of those people who
grew accustomed in Riverside to having electronic voting and I did not want to
see it go backwards, and I think at one point there was an effort to go
backwards on it, and I just think that that would not have been right. I mean, step by step evaluation of the
vendors, I think, is good. And I think
that the Secretary is doing the right job in that regard.
So that would be it. I mean, I’m going to have to take off. My schedule is impacted today beyond my
wildest expectations. And I will try to
come back, but I’m already late for two meetings that I’m already late
for.
Thank you very much, though, for
coming. I appreciate it.
SENATOR BOWEN: Thank you, Senator Battin. So let me begin by just a little bit of
discussion of the state’s process. There
was an article in yesterday’s Oakland
Tribune noting that the Secretary has ordered the voting machine makers to
be done with federal testing by the end of the month, and to be ready for state
testing. That’s a January 31st
deadline?
MR. WOOD: That’s correct, Senator.
SENATOR BOWEN: And I guess my question is, why
was….you have here that it takes historically 50 to 55 days to complete a
voting system certification, assuming that there are no problems identified
during the certification process. Why
was this deadline set for
January 31st, a month following the HAVA and state
compliance? Why wasn’t it set for
October 31st of last year, or November 30th, or
September 30th?
Why are we just getting this deadline now?
MR. WOOD: One of the things that’s critically
important, I think, Senator, is that the process of voting system acquisition
is a vendor driven process. The state of
So at the time period that you’re
talking about in the fall, there were at various points, it looked as though
voting system vendors were going to come forward. It became clear after discussions with them,
that it needed to be made very clear to them that in order for counties, even
with a tight deadline, to have some expectation of being able to deploy systems
if they chose, because they had been certified, to go through the training that
their poll workers would need to go through, to go through the training that the
voter education programs that would be necessary for a voting system. That’s why that deadline was put into place,
so that vendors had a very clear understanding that time had passed and that
anything they were indicating as far as kind of informally in terms of bringing
things forward, these were the deadlines that were going to have to be
met.
I’m going to be clear too, Senator,
that if an application comes in after January 31st, that does not
mean that it’s going to be turned aside.
The Secretary of State is going to continue to review applications as
they come in. The critical point was,
that vendors needed to know that January 31st is the date that we
needed to have so that we could begin our process with the requirements under
SENATOR BOWEN: I’m more confused than I was before
that answer. If there is a January 20th
deadline for submission of a completed application, but the process is vendor
driven, and you will consider anything that comes in even after that deadline,
does the deadline mean anything?
MR. WOOD: Well, I think the deadline is
critical, Senator, because that’s a deadline that the vendors need to
understand is going to be important for us to do the work we need to do to
maintain the reliability and security of the voting equipment, because it’s
just not going to be to the voters’ benefit to have a system out there that has
not gone through a very strict process.
That process, however…
SENATOR BOWEN: We certainly agree on that.
MR. WOOD: Right. But that process clearly needs to unfold
within the timelines that we’ve indicated go through all of its steps. But at the same time, if vendors are thinking
that counties are going to be able to use their equipment, counties need to
have time to deploy the equipment and go through the various training that I’ve
indicated. And if you get past January
31st, that becomes more problematic, based on every discussion that
we’ve had with the counties.
SENATOR BOWEN: All right. But I still don’t have an answer to either of
two questions. First, why is the
deadline for a completed application January 20th if it takes 50 to
55 days to process and we need to allow the counties time. And second, if you’re going to continue to
accept applications after that deadline, what are the consequences of not
meeting the deadline?
MR. WOOD: Well, the consequences are, that it
increases the possibility for an unsuccessful deployment on behalf of a county
that chooses to buy a system. Or, a
county has to devote greater resources to successfully deploy. It just increases the risk. What we’re concerned with now is, working
with the counties and the vendors to see if we can’t do everything under a
timeline that makes sense.
SENATOR BOWEN: Okay.
And then the first question was, if we can set a deadline now for two
days from now, why wasn’t this deadline set last fall when we could have had
the 50 to 55 day process beginning? If
it’s important to send the vendors that kind of clear signal, why not send it
before the HAVA and state law deadlines, rather than after?
MR. WOOD: Well, and I apologize if I’m not
being clear, Senator. In some cases
federal testing had not been completed.
In some cases vendors indicated to us they were coming forward and they
did not. So the question was, we need to
give them an absolute deadline so they knew what deadlines…
SENATOR BOWEN: All right, but it’s not an absolute deadline. You’re using the words “absolute deadline” but
then you’re telling me…
MR. WOOD: It’s an absolute deadline, Senator,
in the sense that this is the date that the counties believe is the one that
makes the most sense for them to successfully deploy equipment that’s
certified. After that, the risk
increases that you’re not going to have a successful deployment.
SENATOR BOWEN: Okay.
With regard to the question of whether the problem was the submission of
completed federal testing, you’ve just testified that there is a different
deadline for the completion of the federal testing, and that would be January
31st. That seems to indicate
to me that a vendor could submit a completed application even before federal
testing was completed—is that correct or not?
MR. WOOD: That is correct. If, however, a vendor fails federal testing,
or is not qualified at the federal level, then we can’t consider their
application.
SENATOR BOWEN: Okay.
But, when we’re looking again at what the date is for the submission of
a completed application, you can’t give, as a reason for not completing the
application, that the federal testing isn’t complete because that process you
set a separate deadline for.
MR. WOOD: I’m sorry, Senator, I don’t quite
understand your question.
KAREN DANIELS-MEADE: If I might. Historically we have required voting system
vendors to complete an entire process and pack it before we will even consider
the application. What we have said we
will do is, we are giving them a little grace period so that they can get some
of the initial materials in which can jumpstart the testing process, and then
we will accept the federal certification up until January 31st to
accompany that process, so that we, in other words, have got the process
started. It’s another step that we’re
trying to take in order to expedite the testing.
SENATOR BOWEN: But what happens if the federal
testing results aren’t submitted by January 31st in your office?
MS. DANIELS-MEADE: What we are basically saying is, if
all of these materials are to us by the end of January, we can guarantee we can
get through the process, assuming there are no problems with your system, in
time to have a hearing of the first part of March, which is the deadline that
the counties have indicated to us they need to know, that’s sort of their drop
dead date for when they can purchase and deploy systems for use in the June
election. So what we’ve done is, sort of
worked backwards and said, okay if the first week of March is the last date
that you can absolutely wait to know, then we need to get all these steps
accomplished prior to that time, and that’s why these particular deadlines have
been set. That’s not to say that we
haven’t been telling vendors all along for the last year or two that there’s a
deadline approaching, we need to see your systems. I mean, we haven’t given them a deadline in
writing, but we certainly have been encouraging them. And we have indeed been told by several of
the vendors, oh, next month we’ll have it.
Next month we’ll have it. And it
hasn’t happened. So we finally said,
look it, they need to understand, we need to have these materials, and we need
to have them now if there’s any hope to be able to use these systems in June.
SENATOR BOWEN: All right.
Well, I guess I’m still unclear as to why these deadlines are being set
now rather than having been set in a timeframe that would have allowed for the
completion of the 30-day notice and the hearing before the December 31st
deadline.
MS. DANIELS-MEADE: I think the most reasonable answer to
that is simply the federal testing has not been completed on enough of the
systems to make it reasonable to set a deadline.
SENATOR BOWEN: Okay, but you’ve since said that
you’re going to have a separate application deadline from the federal testing deadline.
MS. DANIELS-MEADE: But we’ve only given a very short
grace period between those two dates.
SENATOR BOWEN: At the time when the Diebold TSX machine was
sent back for additional federal testing, I don’t remember the exact date, but
it had to have been the end of November or beginning of December, and the
indication that I had from the Secretary of State’s office at that time was
that that was expected to be a two or three week process. Can you, not with regard in particular to
Diebold, but what kind of timeframe are we talking about now to get federal
testing done when it has not been completed?
MR. WOOD: I think I’m going to ask Mr. McDonald
to more fully respond to you, Senator.
Do you mean specifically in the Diebold case, or just in general?
SENATOR BOWEN: I just want to know. Since I was led to think at the time, that it
was going to take two or three weeks to get that done, and we had the November
18th, I believe, hearing on the certification of the Diebold
equipment that was held for…
MS. DANIELS-MEADE: November 21st, I think.
SENATOR BOWEN: Twenty-first.
MS. DANIELS-MEADE: Yeah.
And the letter went December 20th, just for your
information. December 20th is
the date we sent Diebold the letter that we needed additional testing. But we sent it back for further review.
SENATOR BOWEN: And that was expected to take two to
three weeks. And my question more
generally is, what are you anticipating now if you have to send something back
for additional federal testing, how long do you anticipate that it will take?
MR. WOOD: I was going to say, I’m going to let
Mr. McDonald fully answer, but let me just briefly point out though, that
again, this is…when it goes back to a federal independent authority, these are
three labs, I think, and those labs have whatever process they need to go
through in terms of resources, and that was our understanding at the time. We are now informed that there are resource
questions as far as a lab, and that’s why there is a delay. This is again a process outside of the
control of the states and outside of the control of
SENATOR BOWEN: I understand that. I’m just trying to get a fix on when it is
that we might hear.
MR. WOOD: Sure.
Mr. McDonald.
BRUCE MCDONALD: The original projection was based
on Diebold’s initial phone call, the vendors initial phone calls, with the
testing laboratory and their estimate based on the amount of code that needed
to be reviewed. Since they’ve gone back
to the testing laboratory and there have been several questions raised at a
federal level as well about why the source code hadn’t been reviewed previously
during the normal course of testing that, as if anything, probably made the
testing laboratory more conservative in wanting to make sure that they get
everything correct.
The latest word, they’ve been
struggling with the contention of resources.
We expected the turnaround time, they were having a project kickoff
meeting today and we were supposed to get, by the end of the day, a projected
turnaround time for this project to examine the source code.
Right before I came over here I got
an email from the laboratory that one of the members of the team is sick and
they’re having that kickoff meeting now tomorrow. So by tomorrow or Friday we should have a
final turnaround time on how long it will take to complete the project.
SENATOR BOWEN: So the two to three week timeframe
was based on Diebold’s…
MR. WOOD: The initial estimates that we
received from Diebold and their conversations with the ITA.
SENATOR BOWEN: Right. And is the estimate that you just referred
to, or the email, also from Diebold, or is it directly from the ITA?
MR. WOOD: That’s directly with one of our consultants
working with the ITA.
SENATOR BOWEN: All right. So the answer is, we still don’t know how
long it might take.
MR. WOOD: No.
SENATOR BOWEN: Is there any reason that the state
certification process cannot run concurrently with the federal process?
MR. WOOD: And again, I’m going to let Mr.
McDonald explain that better than I can.
But just from a lay perspective, which is the one I understand, is the
federal process is an iterative process in terms of what it goes through in the
testing, and so there are various versions of the systems that are tested
during that iterative process. To run a
parallel test with the state process would mean that at some point if the
federal process changes, a vendor submits a different version, that the state
process is now running along checking a version that is no longer being tested
at the federal level. So the parallel
tests can easily just diverge. But I
think Mr. McDonald can probably put it more eloquently than I can.
MR. MCDONALD: Actually I think that was an accurate
description. We run the risk of testing…
SENATOR BOWEN: So vendors are submitting software that
is not ready for primetime, is what you’re telling me.
MR. WOOD: Frequently, yes.
MS. DANIELS-MEADE: And it really is an iterative
process. I mean, if the federal ITAs
discover an issue that they have concern with, the vendor goes back and changes
it, and then they start over again.
SENATOR BOWEN: Yes, I understand that. But I’m thinking to my experience in another
area of the law where we deal with both federal and state testing, and it has
to do with pesticide certification. And
we don’t wait for one process to finish before the other begins. We try to use a process that moves everything
forward at the same time.
I understand that if something is
changed at the federal level, that it may mean additional work in the Secretary
of State’s office, but we’re in a position now where if material isn’t
submitted to the federal testing labs, or isn’t completed until the end of
February, I see absolutely no way that you could possibly get your part of the
work done in time for the registrars to have any ability to even make a
decision about what they’re going to use in the June election.
MR. MCDONALD: Just as a point of clarification, as
the Under Secretary indicated in his remarks, Elections Code Section 19250
requires that any DRE system that’s proposed to be certified by the state must
first pass federal qualification.
SENATOR BOWEN: I’m not suggesting that the state’s
process do the proposal that it go to the certification process, but we are in
a situation where if we wait for, or if you wait, for the federal government,
or rather, the federal testing labs, because they are not government labs, and
I want to make that clear, they’re private laboratories. They’re not government run. We could very easily be in the situation
where it is impossible for any of the counties, whose situation I laid out, to
use this equipment. And I’m sure that
when we do the next panel and we hear from the registrars, that that’s caused a
lot of extra work there as they sort through the process of trying to figure
out how they are going to conduct an election if they don’t have any HAVA
compliant equipment that they can deploy, or if their only option is the
AutoMark, which is the one system that is certified. Not a DRE, but certified.
MR. WOOD: And I think again, just to clarify a
point, Senator, it’s not just the question of being HAVA compliant, because
these systems are HAVA compliant, it’s the question of being HAVA compliant as
well as meeting our state requirement of having the voter verified paper audit
trail.
SENATOR BOWEN: Okay.
Let me read to you the statute that you’re working under here with
regard to the federal qualification, because it doesn’t say that you may not
recommend certification. It says, you
may not approve a system. The Secretary
of State may not approve a direct recording electronic voting system unless the
system has received federal qualification and includes an accessible voter
verified paper trail. So there is
nothing in this provision of the statute that would lead me to conclude that
you can’t begin the work on the state….you simply can’t give the final
authorization. It doesn’t mean that you
can’t do the part of the work that’s within the state’s purview on the paper
trail.
MR. WOOD: Again, that’s why, perhaps, we accept
the application. We begin working as soon as it’s practical. We accept the application before federal
testing is complete so we can begin the process of evaluating the system,
reviewing the technical documentation, planning a course for testing, actually
doing everything we can to prepare for the certification testing. Historically, the Secretary of State’s
office, I believe, has run into trouble trying to go out and test and certify a
system before federal testing is completed.
And that is the process that we wait until we actually arrive and start
testing the system until we know what the final version of that system is going
to be. We do all that we can in
preparation in advance.
I should also point out, that we do
our testing on the trust to build that is delivered to us directly by the
ITA. That trust to build isn’t completed
and built until the conclusion of the federal testing process.
SENATOR BOWEN: Okay.
Well, a couple of things. One is,
historically we’ve never had the kind of time crunch that we’re going have this
year because we’ve never had a paper trail requirement and a HAVA requirement
kick in at the same time. So, whatever
we’ve dealt with historically, I think probably isn’t very useful, given the
fact that it’s now the middle of January and we still have counties who don’t
have any idea how they’re going to run elections.
So let me go to, I mean, I think
we’ve dealt with the question of the alternatives. Again, I don’t understand the purpose of the
deadline if we’re going to continue to accept applications. I do see that we have now set a split
deadline so that the federal testing doesn’t have to be completed before the
application is complete, and I do wonder why that wasn’t done last fall.
But I want to talk a little bit more
about the state’s certification process and what exactly the state does. If you could talk a little bit about your
process for certification, I think that would be helpful.
Let’s say that the federal
certification requirements have been met by a particular vendor. What is it that the Secretary of State’s
office requires and does after that?
MR. WOOD: And again if I could refer you to
tab-5 on your binder, that’s a listing of the 10-steps that the state
certification process goes through. One
of the critical ones that, of course, has been added by Secretary McPherson is
a volume test. And all of these things,
as
Mr. McDonald indicated, are done either in parallel or in
tandem so that we do eliminate unnecessary waste of time. The volume test however, is an important
addition because this allows for the real world election day testing of a
voting system without having any question about real or live votes being at
risk.
Just one other point, Senator, if
you’d like to go into more detail about these certification processes is, I
mean, there will be an election on June 6th. The voters of
SENATOR BOWEN: Let me go back to something you just
said. You said that the certification
would occur in parallel or in tandem.
I’m not sure what you mean.
MR. WOOD: I meant the steps of the
certification process. So as it
indicates, for example, at step four, step five, step six—step four, the state
certification testing is completed. When
it is done, the following three items are scheduled: volume testing, a demonstration of the system
for election officials and the voting system technology assistance advisory
board, and the scheduling of a public hearing.
At the same time, there’s a publication of the notice of the 30-day
public hearing. And then the volume test
is conducted; a demonstration is run; the draft reports are done. There listed sequentially here, but these
things are also done at the same time.
SENATOR BOWEN: So my question with regard to this
step was, what does the state certification testing involve at the Secretary of
State’s office?
MR. WOOD: I think Mr. McDonald can answer that.
SENATOR BOWEN: Okay.
MR. MCDONALD: The process begins upon receipt of an
application and technical documentation of the voting system under
consideration. When we receive the
application, we review it to make sure all the required components are
there. Review it to get an understanding
of the system, and to understand just exactly how we need to modify our testing
plans so that we can test and exercise the full functionality of the system.
SENATOR BOWEN: What does that mean, modify our
testing plans?
MR. MCDONALD: We have a basic testing plan, but
each system has unique features, so we want to make sure, or this is a system
that has come through with modifications from a prior version that’s already
certified, so we need to modify our basic testing so that we actually exercise
and test those functions that have been added and verified.
SENATOR BOWEN: Are the testing plans published
somewhere?
MR. MCDONALD: We don’t have a published testing
plan. We have a generalized one that is
actually under tab-6, which is more detail.
SENATOR BOWEN: So how would an interested member of
the public know what the testing plan comprises or what modifications have been
made with regard to a particular vendor submission?
MR. MCDONALD: When we finish the testing and
prepare for the public hearing, we write a detailed report and provide all that
information and post it on our website.
It becomes a matter of public record.
SENATOR BOWEN: What happens when you’re dealing with
proprietary code?
MR. MCDONALD: Proprietary code is withheld and not
made public.
SENATOR BOWEN: Right. Can you effectively publish the testing plan
or modifications to the testing criteria without violating the provisions
regarding the code? It’s very hard for
me to understand how you would be able to do that without basically having the
impact of disclosing at least some of the structure of the code, if not the
specifics that you’re testing for.
MR. MCDONALD: Again, the code is not published—that
is proprietary. At times security
features that are evaluated are redacted as well if they’re deemed to be a
public risk to the security system. In
general, what we publish is a description of the features we tested, what
testing was done, and the results of what we found about those features.
SENATOR BOWEN: So that testing plan is published
afterwards, but not before the testing is commenced—is that correct?
MR. MCDONALD: That would be correct.
MR. WOOD: One other thing let me add, Senator,
as I indicated, Secretary McPherson convened the Voting System Testing Summit
in November. We’re completing a report
based on the testimony of a wide variety of experts in election related
areas. One of the goals of that testing
summit was to produce best practices that states could agree on for state level
testing, because we’re committed in California, to a two-tier process. There are federal review, but a state review
in
And what Mr. McDonald was just
describing and what your question goes to, those are all going to be subject
areas that will be looked in terms of best practices that states may wish to
adopt.
SENATOR BOWEN: And when will that be completed?
MR. WOOD: We’re completing the report itself now, and
probably within the next several weeks.
And we hope to hold a public hearing connected with those draft
recommendations.
SENATOR BOWEN: I think my question goes back to the
timing of it. If there’s a draft report
completed in several weeks but that puts us into the middle of February, and if
the goal is to get systems certified by March 10th, how does that…
MR. WOOD: It does not, Senator. I mean, again, I don’t want to be confusing
on this point. The best practices for
the states, which are all in the same position that the state of
SENATOR BOWEN: Well, actually they’re not. They’re actually not because not all states
have a verified paper trail requirement.
MR. WOOD: About half the states do.
SENATOR BOWEN: Okay.
So, but just to go back again.
The testing itself, the testing plan is not made public before it’s
carried out. I’m assuming that that
portion of the certification is not transparent, i.e., if I, or any other
member of the public, wanted to come in and say, can I watch while you’re
testing, the answer would be no?
MR. WOOD: I think the question would be
structuring the observation would be very much like structuring observation at
an election office during election period.
Observers can be there, but it would have to be structured in such a way
it didn’t interfere with the test process itself.
SENATOR BOWEN: What does that mean when the question is
evaluation of software code? Because
observing someone looking at code doesn’t interfere with the testing process, right?
MR. WOOD: Again, the Secretary of State does
not do directly the evaluation of software code itself. That’s generally the province of the ITAs.
SENATOR BOWEN: So tell me what is in the testing
plan then, in general terms. What is in
the testing plan that you’ve laid out for state certification?
MR. WOOD: The testing at state certification
generally works again on the assumption that the federal testing, which does
source code review to meet the federal voting system standards, does more of an
engineering testing the equipment under extremes of heat and temperature,
vibration, humidity, that type of thing.
It verifies the functionality and then compares the functionality,
again, against the federal voting system standards. Our testing assumes that that federal testing
is complete, the system is completed. And
we’re primarily aimed at the functional testing of, does this system conduct an
election in accordance with California law to the proposed procedures for use
in the state of California, give the ability to use the system securely in an
election conducting it in accordance with California law?
SENATOR BOWEN: Is there a reason why the testing, if
that’s what the testing does, why the testing plan can’t be made public before
the testing occurs?
MR. WOOD: I mean, the plan itself, Senator—is
that what you’re referring to?
MS. DANIELS-MEADE: Talking about the protocols.
MR. WOOD: You’re talking about the protocols.
SENATOR BOWEN: You’re testing something and you’re
basically telling people, we’ll tell you at the end whether it met the test,
but we’re not going to tell you what the test is.
MR. WOOD: I think the protocols of the test
absolutely can be made public, very much like the protocols for the volume
test.
SENATOR BOWEN: Good.
I look forward to seeing them.
Obviously the other piece then is if you modify the testing plan. Because of particular equipment, that would
be equally important to be able to view that.
I think it would help people have confidence in the state testing
itself. The fact that we’re here having
a discussion about what that testing comprises, is indicative that it’s not
sufficiently transparent and public at this time.
MR. WOOD: One of the other things I ought to
point out, Senator, that Secretary McPherson promulgated the ten standards for
voting system vendors to meet this summer.
But one of those ten points, which is new for the state of
SENATOR BOWEN: I think that’s the law—right? That’s the law in
MS. DANIELS-MEADE: I think the law is actually that they be
deposited with an escrow…
MR. WOOD: In an escrow. This is with the Secretary of State’s
office. And one of the functions of the
new Office of Voting System Technology Assessment will be to secure those codes,
and if necessary, conduct an independent review.
SENATOR BOWEN: All right.
A couple of questions then on testing and the Independent Testing
Authority. As you know there has been, I
assume you know there has been, some criticism from computer security experts
about the ITA testing procedures, and this will be a subject of a further
hearing. In particular you may have read
Professor ______ Ruben’s critique of the testing. I spent some time with him recently. He told me that one of his graduate computer
science classes he routinely splits his class into two and asks half the class
to hack or change the results in certain voting equipment, and then he assigns
the other half to try to find the modifications, hacks, bugs, whatever you wish
to call them, that the first half of the class has created. And I think he does this both ways, so that
everybody is both the target and the hunter.
He tells me that in most instances is
impossible, even for a graduate level computer science Ph.D. student, to find
in the code, something that would enable an election to be hacked or
stolen. Do you have confidence that the
Independent Testing Authorities can uncover any problems that might occur, and
if so, why is it that the Diebold equipment was certified by the ITAs?
MR. WOOD: We have confidence, I think, in the
state of California, Senator, that the processes that exist before an election,
during election, and after election, would, in fact, detect any attempt to
engage in fraud at either a very small level, or at a massive level, so that
does not involve the ITA in that sense.
I think
SENATOR BOWEN: So you’re arguing that it doesn’t matter that
if the ITA testing uncovers problems, because we have our own…
MR. WOOD:
I’m saying that the ITAs are an integral part of the federal testing
regimen that exists now. But I’m saying,
in the state of
SENATOR BOWEN: Right. But I’m asking you specifically with
regard to the ITAs, whether you have confidence that that step can uncover any
bugs, holes, mal wear, back doors, or other types of manipulation that could
allow either a malicious intervention, or just a mistake?
MR. WOOD:
I believe that those same computer experts would also tell you that,
and argue that, no examination can ever guarantee that you could find any
possible malicious code or bug in any piece of software no matter how much you
examined it, and that’s one of the reasons that we layer these systems with
security procedures. For instance, while
nobody, students in a concerted attack, after several attempts may figure out a
way to breakdown code, that opportunity isn’t afforded in our voting systems.
There are procedures that layer around them and secure them to prevent people from
having that kind of opportunity….detect it if it’s done.
MS. DANIELS-MEADE: Excuse me. One of the things that also came out at the
summit, I mean, it was very clear that everyone who was there was acknowledging
there are deficiencies in the ITA testing process. And the limitations of that process are, that
they are only going to be testing to the federal standards. And so if you have other requirements that
are not specified in those standards, they’re not even examined by the ITAs. One of the things that needs to happen is,
maybe the standards need to be a little more stringent.
SENATOR BOWEN: Great.
We will do a separate hearing on the testing authorities, which all of
that is going to change. We’ll have a
look at that whole process, and I look forward to having your technical input
and your thoughts on that.
But basically,
Mr. Wood, what you said was that the state has other methods of assuring that
the vote isn’t manipulated, and I assume you’re referring to our audit
requirement?
MR. WOOD: In part, yes, Senator. And then processes that exist in terms of
logic and accuracy tests prior to an election, which are public, the processes
that exist during an election in terms of cross checking rosters. The cross check that goes on, the reconciliation
that goes on, and then post election, the various sorts of canvas processes
that go on. One of the things that the Secretary
continued this last election, was a parallel monitoring process, as well, so
that we would have an opportunity to, in a real world setting, see how machines
were functioning. So there are a variety
of steps that are taken both procedural, and mechanical, to ensure that if
there is any difficulty, whether it is advertent, or inadvertent, that
difficulty is detected an corrected.
SENATOR BOWEN: Okay, you didn’t put the audit requirement in
that list, but do you consider the audit requirement an integral part of one of
our checks on the integrity…
MR. WOOD:
Oh, no question about that.
Absolutely.
SENATOR BOWEN: I mean, I ask that only because the Secretary
of State opposed the use of the paper trail to audit the electronic voting
machines in my SB 370 last year.
MR. WOOD:
And actually, again, I want to be really clear on this, Senator. Secretary McPherson, when he was in the
Legislature, was one of the authors of the paper trail requirement. He does not oppose the paper trail. He does not oppose the paper trail as an
audit document. What his concerns are in
relation to your particular bill, had to do more with whether or not there were
sufficient standards in place so that that paper trail could be used for the
purpose which, I think, you intended it to be used, as an audit document. And secondly, that there had been significant
concerns raised by the disabled community, that given the paper trail
requirement, using the paper trail for an audit document would make it
difficult, if not impossible, for some disabled voters to determine what was,
in fact, recorded on the paper trail. So
those are challenges we have to meet in the Secretary of State’s office, and
he’s determined to meet them.
SENATOR BOWEN: All right.
Well, SB 370 is now the law. We
will be using the paper trail in the random audit. But given what you just said with regard to
concerns about whether or not there are technical barriers to actually using
that, I would expect that I would have received something from the Secretary of
State laying out what those technical issues are. Because if they do exist, they’re likely to
get in our way of being able to conduct the SB 370 audit on the DREs. Do we have an analysis of what the problems
are, or are we able to use the paper trail as we expect it to be produced in
order to meet the 370 requirements?
MR. WOOD:
Well, as far as using it in terms of just as an audit document, it
will be used as an audit document. As
you say, that’s the law, and there’s no issue on that. The question that the Secretary of State
still has to face is, how to make that accessible for disabled voters, and
that’s a technical…
SENATOR BOWEN: But that was only one part of the two
objections that were raised. One part
was that it was legally insufficient and that it would be impossible to use
it. Does that concern no longer exist?
MR. WOOD:
No, it was not….again, I apologize if I’m being confusing. The question was not that it was legally
insufficient, it was that there was a problem with simply keeping it in
tact. Right now, there are no real
standards for the paper document. It
needs to have those standards so it can be used fully as the audit document
that SB 370 intends it to be used for.
SENATOR BOWEN: All right.
Does the Secretary of State in the process of setting standards for the
paper?
MR. WOOD:
Yes.
SENATOR BOWEN: And when might we expect those to be
completed?
MR. WOOD: Shortly.
I can’t give you an exact date today, Senator, but shortly.
SENATOR BOWEN: Okay.
And what is the public process for review of what those standards will
be?
MR. WOOD:
We’ll be glad to work those out in conjunction with your office.
SENATOR BOWEN: So, absent this hearing, the standards will
just be promulgated and there would be no…
MR. WOOD:
Absent this hearing, Senator, the process would be to put them into
regulation at which time there is a public hearing. So there is a public hearing no matter
what. But we would be delighted to work
with your office in formulating those standards.
SENATOR BOWEN: But I guess my question, again, is with
regard to timing. Because if there is a
concern about the standards for the paper and that is essential to the use of
the paper trail in the audit, then that ought to be one of the things that’s
dealt with in the certification of the equipment—right? Because if it produces a paper trail that we
can’t use in the audit, it seems to me it ought not be certified by the
Secretary of State.
MR. WOOD:
The point, I think, Senator, is it will be used as an audit
document. Again, I don’t want to belabor
it or sound confusing, it will be used as an audit document. Going forward, that audit document needs to
have the kinds of security and protections that SB 370 contemplated I believe
it have so that it can be fully utilized as an audit document. But for paper trails that exist at the time
of the June primary, they will be used, as 370 contemplated, as an audit
document.
SENATOR BOWEN: All right.
I will have some other questions on that. I’m going to go back and look at the
Secretary’s opposition to
SB 370 because my recollection of it is that there were
technical issues with regard to the use of the paper as an audit, and I don’t
know of anything that would have changed those, so I will pursue that later,
because that is not what people are here to deal with.
Let me ask you what the status is of the hack test that the Secretary of State promised to conduct with Finnish computer expert Harri Hursti, who, as you know, was able to change the results on several Diebold optical scan machines in Florida using the memory cards from something that I’m familiar with as a